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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 1994 La Conexion Familiar, Inc. ("LCF"), a subsidiary
of Sprint corporation located in San Francisco, California, terminated its
business due to alleged financial difficulties within eight days of a union
certification election' that promised to be the first successful representa-
tion drive among Sprint's long distance operators.2 LCF telemarketed
long distance services, targeting recent Hispanic immigrants by provid-
ing all services and correspondence in Spanish. Notably, Sprint has no
long distance employees represented by a union, although eighteen thou-
sand employees are employed in their long distance division.3 In the
face of what appeared to be a successful representation drive by the
Communication Workers of America ("CWA"), LCF supervisors
threatened plant closure should the union drive succeed;' this despite the
fact that such threats employed by management during election drives
1. On June 3, 1994, Communication Workers of America ("CWA") filed a petition with the
National Labor Relations Board requesting a certification election concurrent with a showing of
support for the union by the majority of employees in the bargaining unit. On June 22, 1994, the
parties stipulated to a certification election to be held on July 22, 1994. See LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B.
Case 20-CA-26203 at 12, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 988, at *34 (Aug. 30, 1995).
2. See LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 at 25 n.20.
As early as 1991, Sprint became the target of unions affiliated with the Postal, Telegraph and
Telephone International ("PTTI")-the worldwide umbrella organization for postal and
telecommunications unions-who urged Sprint to allow its American workers to unionize under
the auspices of the CWA. The General Secretary of PTT I stated that Sprint paid several thousand
dollars less per year in salaries than other unionized companies and that its health insurance
scheme was inferior. See International Union Pressuring Sprint, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222,
at A16 (Nov. 18, 1991).
3. See Clay Chandler and Frank Swoboda, A Union Rehabilitates NAFTA: After Fighting
Treaty, U.S. Labor Group Turns to Mexico for Help, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1996, at C1.
4. See LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 at 34.
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are illegal.5 In addition, many other unfair labor practices abounded at
LCF, including the interrogation of employees concerning union activi-
ties, requests by supervisors that employees distribute anti-union but-
tons, management's solicitation of grievances of employees and the
creation of the impression that management was conducting surveillance
of employees' union activities.6
Sprint maintained that LCF was closed because of its financial
standing.7 While it is uncontroverted that LCF was performing poorly
financially, the contention that financial status was the predominant fac-
tor motivating the LCF board of directors in its decision to close the
company is vigorously disputed.' The union asserts that a discrimina-
tory union avoidance strategy motivated the decision to close LCF in
violation of the statutory guarantees of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)-specifically, the rights contained in Section 8(a)(3) and, by
necessary implication, Section 7.9
The union points to evidence that, in spite of Sprint's assertions
that it closed LCF due to its poor financial condition, Sprint was com-
mited to retaining LCF as a going concern, a commitment that included
giving the business time to implement a turn-around plan. This evidence
includes the purchase of new expensive equipment, the expansion of
office space, continued workforce training and the hiring of a new presi-
dent one month before the decision to close."0 Additionally, the union
argues that a falsely dated letter produced by a top Sprint labor official,
memorializing a conversation that allegedly concerned placement of the
soon-to-be terminated LCF employees, is circumstantial evidence of the
company's anti-union sentiment. The union argues that such action
demonstrates that Sprint was building a paper trail defense to the charge
5. See NLRB v Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969).
6. See LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 at 34. The administrative law judge noted:
The Complaint herein contains various allegations of conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the [N.L.R.A.]. The parties' stipulations and/or evidence presented by the
General Counsel constitutes evidence of such violations, and the Respondent has
proffered no contrary evidence. It therefore appears that a factual analysis of such
violations is unnecessary, and I find, based on the stipulated or undenied record
evidence, that the Respondent has committed such violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the [N.L.R.A.].
Id. at 34 n.27.
7. See id. at 14-15.
8. See General Counsel's Brief to the Board in Support of Exceptions to the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision at 66-68, LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 (Aug. 30, 1995).
9. See Brief for Communication Workers of America, District Nine, and CWA Local 9410
in Support of the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge at 34, LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-
CA-26203 (Aug. 30, 1995).
10. See id. at 22-24.
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of discriminatory closing of the plant.a1  The union additionally contends
that Sprint's choice of paying terminated employees for sixty days pay
rather giving them sixty days notice prior to the closing of certain cate-
gories of business, as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Act,' 2 as is Sprint's usual pattern, demonstrates an unwillingness to risk
the unionization of its workforce.13 This charge is buttressed by the fact
that Sprint was forced to hire additional workers at its Dallas facility,
where calls were routed following LCF's closing.'
4
Sprint argues, however, that financial considerations rather than
anti-union sentiment dictated closing LCF. Sprint further contends that
the decision to close LCF was all but made at a board of directors' meet-
ing held before the company was aware of the pending union organiza-
tion drive. 15 Sprint also argues that a consistently smaller customer base
each month precluded the operation of LCF as a profitable business.
16
Sprint counters the circumstantial evidentiary value of its decision to
hire Maury Rosas, a new President for LCF, one month before closing
by suggesting that Rosas had value as a potential employee of Sprint,
11. See id. at 12-13. Sprint subsequently withdrew the falsified document. The letter's
author told Sprint officials that he could not recall the alleged conversation ever taking place. See
id. at 13. Sprint still maintains, however, that the conversation did take place. Moreover, Sprint
argues because it brought forward the fact of the letter's falsification, the argument cuts the other
way; i.e., since it reported the falsified document to the government it clearly had nothing to hide
with regard to the charge of anti-union discrimination. See Respondent's Brief in Support of
Decision by Administrataive Law Judge at 21, LCF., Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 (Aug. 30,
1995).
12. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988).
Employers with one-hundred or more full-time employees or with employees, part-time and full-
time, who total four thousand working hours per week are covered by the Act. See id.
§ 2101(a)(l). Notwithstanding specific exemptions and exceptions from the provisions of the Act,
employers who are covered by WARN are, inter alia, required to give sixty days notice prior
closing their plants. See id.; see also generally Jessia L. Stein, The Worker Adjustment
Retraining and Notification Act (WARN): What is the Meaning Behind the Language? 19 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 648 (1995); John O'Connor, Employers Be Forewarned: An Employer's Guide to
Plant Closing and Layoff Decisions After the Enactment of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, 16 OHio N.U. L. REv. 19 (1989).
13. The risks to Sprint of union certification may be substantial insofar as operating costs.
CWA offered a comparison of AT&T and Sprint salaries (based upon 1990 non-national data)
which suggests a 24.7 % salary differential among operators of each company. Additionally, the
figures suggest that AT&T paid 33.3% more than Sprint to its service representatives and 9.2%
more than Sprint to its telephone technicians. See Safeguards Needed for Workers on Information
Highway, CWA Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No 134, at D19 (July 15, 1994).
14. See Brief for Communications Workers of America, District Nine and CWA Local 9410
in Support of the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge at 32, LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-
CA-26203.
15. See Respondent's Brief in Support of Decision by Administrative Law Judge at 7, LCF,
Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203. Sprint contended that the board of directors merely put off the
inevitable decision to close LCF at this time and resolved to give the LCF sixty more days to see if
they could sell it or to see if the company could turn itself around. See id.
16. See id. at 3-4.
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irrespective of LCF's viability.' 7 Sprint also presented evidence that
closing in July rather than waiting until the end of the fiscal year
resulted in net savings of four million dollars.' 8 In summary, Sprint
argued and continues to argue that the decision to close LCF stemmed
from its poor financial performance rather than a union avoidance
strategy.
The NLRA grants eligible employees the statutory right to organize
and form unions for the purpose of collective bargaining. Section 7 of
the NLRA guarantees workers, "the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection."' 9 Other statutory provisions of the NLRA are intented to
safeguard the fundamental rights granted in Section 7. Section 8 of the
NLRA includes as unfair labor practices, activities which interfere with
Section 7.20 Specifically, Section 8(a)(3) prohibits "discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organ-
ization."'" An employer closing shop to avoid unionization of its
workforce ostensibly violates the protective language of Section 8(a)(3),
and by extension, the fundamental rights granted in Section 7.
American case law, however, has mitigated the clear mandate of
these provisions.22 An employer may with impunity close its entire
business simply to avoid unionization of its workforce, despite the statu-
tory language of Sections 7 and 8.23 Only when an employer closes part
of a larger enterprise in a discriminatory manner is the decision properly
scrutinized under the standard of Section 8(a)(3).24 If, however, the
plant is part of a larger concern, an employer's decision to close one of
the shops is shielded from statutory remedies if it demonstrates that it
had other "legitimate" motives, even where an anti-union motive
exists. 25 Therefore, legal decisions interpreting the mandate of section
17. See id. at 7.
18. See id. at 8.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
20. See id. § 158(a)(1).
21. See id. § 158(a)(3).
22. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965).
23. See id. at 273-74.
24. See id. at 275.
25. See, e.g., NLRB v Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's
Wright Line standard, which allocated the burden of proof in employer discrimination cases in
NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 492 U.S. 393 (1983). Once the General Counsel of the NLRB has
made a prima facie case that protected conduct under the NLRA has motivated discriminatory
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8(a)(3) have injured the actual rights of American workers to organize
into unions, delineated in Section 7.
This statutory structure, and, more importantly, its interpretation in
case law, provided the framework through which the LCF closing was
analyzed in the American legal system. Implicit to this analysis is the
philosophic underpinning that capital should be able to freely and with-
out impediment close shop, which in turn largely trumps the statutory
rights granted in Section 7 of the NLRA.26 Because the doctrine gov-
erning partial closings is settled law, the philosophic assumptions under-
lying the law are largely veiled from judicial scrutiny. Adherence to
precedent in the American judicial system precludes significant re-order-
ing of the values embedded in the doctrine governing Section 8(a)(3)
closings.
Recently, however, a new forum has opened for challenges to labor
doctrines that are inimical to the broad statutory rights ostensibly
granted in the express language of the NLRA. The North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"),27 the supplemental
agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),
28
provides a new venue in which to mount challenges to enforcement and
implementation of American labor law.
Although designed with marked deference for the sovereignty of
each nation, NAALC allows for complaints against other member
nations for non-enforcement of their own labor laws.2 9 The result of
political forces that threatened NAFTA's defeat, the labor accords were
touted as an ameliorative response to poor Mexican working conditions
and the downward pull they may exact on the American labor norm. 31
The purpose of the labor agreements was to provide a model of transna-
employer action, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the action would have occurred
regardless of the protected conduct. See id. at 400.
26. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMPrIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 166-67
(1983).
27. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
28. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296
[hereinafter NAFTA].
29. See Review of NAFTA-Related Labor Issues to Be Conducted Cooperatively, DDL Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 66, at D1I (Apr. 7, 1994).
30. American labor organizations were decisively against NAFTA. See Betty Southard
Murphy, NAFTA's North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: The Present and the
Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403, 404-05 (1995). The idea of supplemental labor agreements
emerged during President Clinton's presidential campaign. One might surmise it was the result of
his political attempt to keep the New Democratic coalition together. Although many labor groups
remained vociferously opposed to NAFTA even after the NAALC was negotiated, NAALC did
provide some political cover as far as the traditionally Democratic labor constituents were
concerned.
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tional labor relations whereby each party could monitor and spur
enforcement of the other party's internal labor policy.
The international forum available under NAALC does not require
that domestic labor law remedies be exhausted, merely that actions and
remedies to enforce domestic labor laws have been initiated.31 Thus, the
NAALC forum may function as a concurrent alternative to the remedy
sought in any of the member nations so long as there is some credible
allegation that a signatory country is not enforcing its domestic labor
laws. Labor groups in the U.S., initially among the most vehement
detractors of NAFTA and NAALC, and who conceived of NAALC as
the barest and flimsiest of protections, have begun to employ the process
implemented by the labor accords to further effectuate enforcement of
American labor principles embodied in the NLRA, in addition to enforc-
ing Mexican labor law.32
The LCF case may, and arguably should, become a prototype for a
new type of labor case. Major areas of American labor law are settled in
ways that preclude or significantly limit judicial challenges and mean-
ingful remedies. 33 The procedures that NAALC has put into place offer
labor activists a way to challenge some of the implicit philosophic
assumptions firmly embedded in American labor law. This Comment
will focus upon the LCF case as it has and continues to proceed through
the two track system contemplated by NAALC. This process will illu-
minate what are the beginnings of an emerging international strategy by
labor unions to challenge domestic enforcement of American labor
law.3
4
Because the LCF case entered the NAALC arena by a complaint
initiated in Mexico, this Comment primarily analyzes the interplay of
31. See Lance A. Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights
Regime Takes Shape, 3 U.S.-MFx L.J. 159, 164-65 (1995) for the U.S NAO rules.
32. See Geri Smith & John Pearson, Which Side (of the Border) Are You On? Well, Both:
U.S. Unions Use NAFTA Side Accord to Step Up Efforts in Mexico, Bus. WK., Apr. 4, 1994, at
50; Dora Delgado, NAFTA: Jury Should Remain Out on Power of Labor Side Accord. Officials
Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at D25 (Mar. 4, 1996).
33. See Manuel Fuentes Muftiz, The NAFTA Labor Side Accord in Mexico and its
Repercussions for Workers, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379. 394-97 (1995). Mufiiz argues that four
areas where American labor law departs from the principles espoused in NAALC are anti-union
discrimination, the scope of labor law coverage which excludes certain categories of employees,
erosion of the right to strike through the doctrine of permanent replacement for economic strikers
and doctrines governing access to unorganized workers in their workplace. See id. at 394-96.
These doctrinal areas are arguably where American case law departs from a firm commitment to
the right to organize into unions for the purpose of collective bargaining.
34. Obviously, such a strategy should be followed with regard to Mexican enforcement of
labor law as well. This already has occurred. Four complaints have been issued via the NAALC
process against Mexico for non-enforcement of its own laws. See Delgado, supra note 32, at D25.
It is more important at this point to bring the American labor movement to appreciate what
NAALC offers insofar as mounting challenges to U.S. enforcement of its own labor regime.
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the labor laws, economies, and the NAALC processes between Mexico
and the United States. This analysis is applicable to Canada as a signa-
tory to the NAFTA agreement and any additional nations that accede to
NAFTA under its present terms.35
After briefly explaining the origin of NAALC, this Comment
examines the initiation, complaint and adjudication or review processes
in both the United States' administrative law forum and the NAALC
forum as they consecutively occurred in the Sprint case. Although there
are some limitations to this approach-perhaps it suggests a causal rela-
tionship between events that may not always be warranted and, further,
falsely implies that relief under NAALC must be accompanied by judi-
cial appeals-this is a superior way of looking at the process for a
number of reasons. First, consecutive examination of the moves in each
of the alternative forums helps illlustrate how one action has at least the
potential for influencing the outcome in the other forum. This has major
implications as a strategy for labor unions. Moreover, comprehensive
understanding of the dual track for relief available under NAALC is fur-
thered by examining the LCF events as they unfolded chronologically,
rather than as they navigate through each specific track.
II. THE ORIGIN OF NAALC
Political necessity gave birth to NAALC. Negotiation of NAFTA
without any explicit provisions for labor standards provoked deep and
spirited opposition among American labor unions and pro-labor politi-
cians. 6 United States congressional representatives opposing NAFTA
argued alternatively for an agreement that would harmonize labor norms
in all participating countries, sanction violations from these norms as
"actionable unfair trade practice[s]," and create a dispute resolution
mechanism that would enforce North American labor standards.37
Labor's opposition to NAFTA appeared to hinge on two ideas. First,
35. Chile is being discussed as the newest proposed member of the NAFTA. At this time it is
not clear whether acceders to NAFTA would be brought under the same terms, including
NAALC, as are the current signatories to the Agreement. See Pamela M. Prah, International
Labor: Talks With Chile on NAFTA Expansion Continue Unofficially, Negotiator Says, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at D20 (Feb. 16, 1996). "Of particular interest to the U.S. Labor Department
are the changes Chile is contemplating to its labor laws, Otero [Clinton's intended nominee as
Labor Department's assistant secretary for international labor] said. These include reforms to
make it easier for unions in Chile to enter into collective bargaining agreements with employers
.... .Id.
36. There was opposition in Mexico as well. The Mexican opposition politicians advocated an
alternative pact to NAFTA which would create European style structures to encourage trade and
investment as well as promote North American labor solidarity. See Michael J. McGuinness, The
Protection of Labor Rights in North America: A Commentary on the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation, 30 SrAN. J. INT'L L. 579, 579-80 (1994).
37. See id. at 579 (quoting H.R. 1445, 103rd Congress, 1st Sess. (1993)).
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labor feared that mutual elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers
would lead to import surges from Mexico which would result in the loss
of US jobs.38 Second, labor feared Mexico's lack of enforcement of its
labor laws would give Mexico a competitive advantage over the U.S.
with a resulting loss of U.S. jobs.39 Conspicuously absent from the
NAFTA debate was any discussion of U.S. labor laws themselves being
rife with loopholes in their commitment to workers' organizational and
collective bargaining rights.4°
The dynamics of the 1992 presidential campaign paved the way for
NAALC. Perot's vehement opposition to NAFTA countered President
Bush's wholesale endorsement of the treaty he shepherded. Candidate
Bill Clinton positioned himself between the two extremes. He supported
NAFTA conditionally-he insisted upon negotiation of side accords by
the signatory countries.4' Once President, Clinton negotiated labor and
environmental side accords, an agreement of these issues was reached
on August 13, 1993.42 Although the agreement addressed some of
labor's concern, it hardly stemmed all of labor's opposition to NAFTA.
Many labor leaders and pro-labor politicians continued to assail Clinton
for his support of NAFTA and lobbied heavily against its passage.43 In
late November 1993, however, Congress passed the North American
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,44 which Clinton signed on
December 8, 1993. 45
38. See Shellyn G. McCaffrey, North American Free Trade and Labor Issues:
Accomplishments and Challenges, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 449, 461 (1993). Import surges from
Mexico were believed to be a threat to workers in general and to specific industries. A related
concern was that Mexico's proximity to the U.S., the largest consumer market in the world, in
conjunction with the special trade status accorded by NAFTA, would make Mexico a foreign
company's dream locale for targeting the U.S. market. See id. at 463.
39. See id. at 461-62; see also Coalition Including Labor Groups Launches Campaign to
Defeat NAFTA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at A5, (Dec. 17, 1992) (quoting the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters President as saying that NAFTA "will give companies the opportunity
to eliminate even more good American ... jobs and exploit workers in Mexico").
40. See Charles W. Nugent, Comment, A Comparison of the Right to Organize and Bargain
Collectively in the United States and Mexico: NAFTA 's Side Accords and Prospects for Reform, 7
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 197, 224 (1994).
41. See Judith H. Bello, The Current Status of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 2
U.S.-MEx L.J. 5, 6-7 (1994).
42. See Agreement on Side Deals Reached Among NAFTA Parties, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 156, at D3 (Aug. 16, 1993).
43. See Chandler & Swoboda. supra note 3, at Cl. "U.S. labor unions in 1993 spent a small
fortune in an unsuccessful effort to kill the North American Free Trade Agreement." Id. The
bitter fight against NAIFTA's passage may explain labor's slow response to the procedure's
available through NAALC. There was so much vociferous anti-NAFrA rhetoric that it may now
be very difficult for these detractors to switch gears and explore what the mechanism has to offer.
44. Pub. L. No. 103-82 (1993).
45. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 403 n.2 (1995). Congress included a provision in its
implementation legislation for NAFTA that required the signatory countries to enact a North
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NAALC provides an elaborate and complicated framework for pro-
tecting labor standards and conditions in the signatory countries that
focuses primarily upon mutual cooperation. Basically, compliance with
NAALC means compliance with and enforcement of the signatory's
own domestic labor law. In this way, the agreement respects the sover-
eignty of the member countries' labor law.46 Important to understanding
this approach is that both Canada and Mexico have more protective
labor regimes than the United States.47 Although U.S. concerns over
Mexican labor conditions were the driving impetus leading to NAALC,
these conditions do not stem from a lack of Mexican constitutional or
statutory guarantees; rather, problems with enforcement of Mexican
labor laws, particularly in the maquiladora region, account for U.S.'s
topical vision of Mexico as lacking any labor guarantees.48 This lack of
enforcement arguably stems from problems with corrupt union leaders
and the alliances between the majority of Mexican unions and the gov-
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation prior to NAFTA going into effect. See id. at 405.
NAALC opened for signature September 8, 1993, and entered into effect January 1, 1994. See id.
at 426 n.13.
46. NAALC, supra note 27, art. 2, at 1503 provides:
Affirming full respect for each Party's constitution and recognizing the right of each
Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its labor laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its labor laws
and regulations provide for high labor standards, consistent with high quality and
productivity workplaces, and shall continue to strive to improve those standards in
that light.
This is in contrast to an explicit harmonizing approach-one that establishes one standard for all
member countries. The implicit hope of NAALC is that free trade with its ameliorative effect on
the economies of all signatory countries and better enforcement of each country's domestic labor
regime will lead to a higher degree of harmonization of the labor regimes of the three member
countries.
47. MEx. CoNsT. arts. 5, 123. Although Mexico has had lax enforcement of its laws, Mexican
labor law is constitutionally based. Both the Mexican Constitution and the 1970 Federal Labor
Law grant employees and employers freedom of association and the right of unionization. See
"Ley Federal Del Trabajo," D.O. (Mex.). Furthermore, Mexican workers are offered in some
areas more substantive protections than US workers enjoy. Mexican employees are entitled to
profit sharing equal to ten percent of their employer's pretax income and can only be terminated
for cause. See Elizabeth C. Crandall, Comment, Will NAFTA's North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation Improve Enforcement of Mexican Labor Laws? TRANSNAT'L LAW. 165, 176-
77 (1994). On both the federal and state level, Mexican laws parovide for boards to arbitrate
allegations of violations of labor protections or of collective bargaining agreements. See id. at
177. So long as a strike is termed "legally existent," i.e., the majority of workers voted for it and
the strike comports with strict procedural requirements, upon termination of the strike all workers
are entitled to return to work provided they have not been involved in illegal activity. See Nugent,
supra note 40, at 208-09.
In fact, Mexican law is arguably even more protective of workers than Canadian law. See
Francisco Brefla Garduflo, The Impact of NAFTA on Labor Legislation in Mexico, 1 U.S.-MEx.
L.J. 219, 221 (1993). NAALC logically focuses on enforcement of the labor regime of each
country. It would be incongruous to impose the less protective labor regime of the U.S. upon the
signatory countries to ameliorate Mexico's labor conditions.
48. See Crandall, supra note 47, at 177-81.
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erning party. Independent unions, with organizing goals independent
from the politics of the ruling party, struggle precipitously for their own
existence in a system which scarcely recognizes them.49 NAALC
addresses these concerns and others by providing mechanisms whereby
the compliance of the signatory countries with their own domestic labor
regimes is encouraged.
The Preamble of NAALC reiterates the signatories' resolve in
NAFTA to "create an expanded and secure market for the goods and
services produced in their territories, enhance the competitiveness of
their firms in global markets, create new employment opportunities and
improve working conditions and living standards in their respective ter-
ritories, and protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights."50 In
pursuit of this the signatories agreed to promote and incorporate the fol-
lowing principles into their domestic labor law and practices:
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize
2. The right to bargain collectively
3. The right to strike
4. Prohibition of forced labor
5. Labor protection for children and young persons
6. Minimum employment standards
7. Elimination of employment discrimination
8. Equal pay for women and men
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses
10. Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses.
11. Protection of migrant workers.
51
To more effectively promote these principles and encourage
enforcement of the signatory's domestic labor law, NAALC created tri-
lateral structures among the signatories, as well as internal governmental
structures in each of the participating nations.52
NAALC established a tri-national commission, the Commission for
Labor Cooperation ("Commission"), to effectuate its goals and proce-
dures.5 3 The Commission consists of a ministerial council ("council")
and Secretariat.54 The council is the governing body of the Commission
and is composed of labor ministers from each signatory country. The
council meets at least once each year.-5 Its responsibilities include guid-
49. See Id. at 178-79.
50. NAALC, supra note 27, preamble, at 1502.
51. Id. annex I at 1515-16.
52. See Id. arts. 8-16 at 1504-07.
53. See Id. art. 8,§ 1 at 1504.
54. See Id., § 2 at 1504.
55. See id. art. 9 at 1505,
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ing and prescribing the operations of the Secretariat and "of any com-
mittees or working groups convened by the council; establishing
priorities for cooperative action and developing technical assistance pro-
grams; facilitating consultations and information exchange between the
parties; and promoting the collection and publication of data on enforce-
ment, labor standards, and labor market indicators. 56
The Secretariat has an executive director and a small staff, includ-
ing a labor law director.57 The Secretariat provides reports on labor law
and administrative procedures, labor conditions and human resource
development.58 It contracts with outside entities to provide many of
these reports.59 The Secretariat is also charged with preparing any spe-
cial studies that the council may request under NAALC's special study
clause.6° A "special study" may consider all pertinent information in its
conclusions, including that of experts, and may make recommendations
upon the subject matter.6'
NAALC creates three National Administrative Offices ("NAO"s)
in each of the signatory countries. 62 They are charged with "bring[ing]
labor complaints to the attention of the Commission for resolution or
dispute settlement" and "provid[ing] publicly available information
requested by the [S]ecretariat for background reports or studies, another
party's NAO, or an Evaluation Committee of Experts. 63
Any interested person may bring a complaint to an NAO. 64 Article
16(3) provides that "[e]ach NAO shall provide for the submission.., of
public communications on labor law matters arising in the territory of
another Party. Each NAO shall review such matters, as appropriate, in
accordance with domestic procedures. 6 5 Violations under NAALC
56. Crandall, supra note 47, at 183.
57. See Telephone Interview with Lance A. Compa, Labor Law Director of the NAFTA
Labor Secretariat (Feb. 12, 1996).
58. See NAALC, supra note 27, art. 14, § 1 at 1506.
59. See Telephone Interview with Lance A. Compa, supra note 57.
60. See NAALC, supra note 27, art. 14, § 2 at 1506-07.
61. See id.
62. See id., art. 15 at 1507,
63. Crandall, supra note 47, at 184. Betty Southard Murphy notes,
As part of its investigations, Article 21 of NAALC permits a NAO to seek the
assistance of the NAO in the country being investigated regarding the requested
country's labor law, administration of those laws, and the labor market conditions in
the country. The purpose of this provision is clear: it allows the investigating NAO
to make the most informed decision as to whether the country being investigated is
effectively enforcing its laws. The requested NAO, in responding to the request,
must provide any publicly available information concerning its domestic laws,
procedures and policies. (citations omitted),
Murphy, supra note 30, at 411.
64. See Crandall, supra note 47, at 185.
65. NAALC, supra note 27, art. 16, § 3 at 1507.
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occur when another party to the treaty is not upholding its obligation to
enforce its own labor laws. The NAO's function of bringing labor com-
plaints to the Commission emphasizes their most interesting aspect.
Despite the labor side accord's deep commitment to the sovereignty of
each signatory, the NAOs necessarily encroach upon this sovereignty in
some sense to investigate and evaluate complaints that other member
nations are failing in their obligations under NAALC. Thus, the NAOs
must evaluate and review the labor law of the other participating coun-
tries. 6 6 If, following the investigation and review, the NAO determines
the Party has failed to comply with its obligation under NAALC, the
NAO may recommend ministerial consultations.
Only three of the eleven principles listed above, however, may go
forward to dispute resolution by an Arbitral Panel.67 Complaints based
upon the right of association, the right to bargain and the right to strike
avail themselves only in the consultation provisions of NAALC.68 This
has spurred some of the most vehement criticism of NAALC. The argu-
ment is that in an effective labor regime these rights are more fundamen-
tal than any others and that their absence from the enforcement structure
effectively eviscerates any commitment NAALC has to a potent labor
movement in any of the signatory countries.69
The second tier of enforcement provides for evaluation and recom-
mendations by a tri-national Evaluation Committee of Experts
("ECE"). 70 Five of the principles espoused in the NAALC rise no fur-
ther than this second tier, including the prohibition of forced labor, equal
pay for men and women, employment discrimination, compensation in
the case of work accidents and occupational disease, and protection of
migrant workers.7'
The remaining principles that NAALC embodies-restrictions on
labor by children and young persons, occupational safety and health
laws and provisions relating to minimum wage-do rise above the con-
sultation and recommendation stages." A pattern of violations here may
66. See Compa, supra note 31, at 163.
67. See Lance A. Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S. Hemispheric Labor
Rights Policy under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337, 355 (1995). This accounts for
much of the criticism of NAALC. Arguably, the rights of association, the right to bargain and the
right to strike are the most important rights to any labor regime that is committed to empowering
its workers. Without these rights, labor has very little economic muscle to exert in protection of
itself. See id. at 355-57.
68. See id. at 356.
69. See Mufiiz, supra note 33, at 392.
70. See NAALC, supra note 27, art. 23 at 1508.
71. See id., art. 49 at 1513-14. By defining "technical labor standards," Article 49 eliminates
from treatment by the ECE the right of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively
and the right to strike. See id.
72. See id., arts 38-41 at 1511-13.
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result in fines and suspension of benefits of the signatory country.73
A pro-labor perspective may see only what is not offered, for the
weaknesses of the system are glaring. As Manuel Fuentes Mufiiz notes,
First, the fundamental labor rights that give voice to working peo-
ple-freedom of association and the right to engage in political
action, rights to organize and bargain collectively, and the right to
strike-are excluded from anything more than consultation. Other
issues of paramount importance are open to an evaluation, but not
arbitration and potential sanctions. Finally, even the three subjects
potentially susceptible to trade sanctions depend on enforcement of
national law, not compliance with international standards. Weak
national laws are insulated from reform, as long as they are applied.74
This view is common and most likely accounts for the unhurried pace of
labor to instigate complaints and devise innovative strategies to attempt
to extract some measure of relief from NAALC.75
The first challenges brought under NAALC alleged that Mexico
failed to enforce its labor law with respect to anti-union discrimination
against Mexican workers organizing for an independent union.7 The
International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT") and the United Electri-
cal Radio and Machine Workers of America ("UE") filed complaints
with the U.S. NAO on February 14, 1994, shortly after the provisions of
NAALC went into effect.77 The LBT submission addressed alleged
events at a Honeywell plant in Chihuahua and the UE submission con-
cerned events at a General Electric plant in Ciudad Juarez.78 The com-
plaints alleged anti-union discrimination, unlawful under Mexican law.79
The U.S NAO reviewed the allegations in the complaints as they related
to the principles of right of association and freedom to organize.8"
Although the U.S. NAO conducted hearings, communicated with the
73. See id.
74. Mufiiz, supra note 33, at 393.
75. A more rigorous test of NAALC might include bringing cases upon each of the eleven
principles contained in Annex 1. So far the cases testing the provisions of NAALC have only
alleged non-enforcement of laws, with regard to the principles that may be enforced by no higher
mechanism than ministerial consultations. This is a slow assault considering patterns of non-
enforcement with regard to some of the principles-child labor standards, minimum wage
standards and occupational safety and health-which can result in monetary fines and suspension
of NAFTA benefits. See NAALC, supra note 27, arts. 39-41 at 1511-13.
76. See Compa, supra note 31, at 159.
77. See id. at 165.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 165-66. Compa notes, "(b]oth submissions were accompanied by sworn
affidavits from Mexican workers alleging that they were discharged for union activity. Such anti-
discrimination is unlawful under the Mexican Constitution, the Mexican Federal Labor Law, and
ILO Convention 87, ratified by Mexico and thus part of its law." Id.
80. See id. at 166. These principles are susceptible only to ministerial consultations. See
NAALC, supra note 27, art. 22 at 1508.
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Mexican NAO, commissioned studies of Mexican labor law and admin-
istrative procedures, and recommended a series of cooperative programs
regarding associational and organizing rights, it did not, in its final
report, conclude that Mexico failed to enforce its domestic labor law.8l
The next claim filed against Mexico for non-enforcement of its
laws involved the Sony Corporation. The complaint alleged, and the
U.S. NAO report agreed, that workers were probably fired because of
their independent organizing activities and that the Mexican government
thwarted workers' efforts to organize an independent union.8 2 Follow-
ing the U.S. NAO report, U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich requested
ministerial consultations with his Mexican counterpart pursuant to the
NAALC agreement.8 3 The ministerial consultations resulted in an
agreement that directed the Mexican NAO to bring independent experts
together to study union registration. 4 In addition, the fired Mexican
workers received public hearings. The consultations also led to an
agreement that the signatory countries would instruct the respective
NA~s to initiate a program to explain and improve union registration.85
III. MILLER V. LCF
The regional office in San francisco, California of the National
Labor Relations Board (the "Board"), the agency charged with admin-
stering the NLRA, documented over fifty separate incidents of unfair
labor practices in its investigation of the LCF closing. It asked Sprint to
consider reaching a settlement that included reopening the plant and
restoring its employees to their former positions.8 6 The Board issued an
unfair labor practice complaint against Sprint on September 12, 1994,
that contained, inter alia, the allegation that Sprint had closed the facil-
ity to avoid unionization of its LCF workforce. On September 16, the
Board announced its intention to seek a temporary injunction under Sec-
tion 10(j) of the NLRA 7 to restore, the status of the plant pending the
Board's adjudication of the unfair labor practices.88
81. See Compa, supra note 31, at 176.
82. See Pamela M, Prah, NAFTA: U.S., Mexico Unveils Plans in Response to Sony Charge




86. See NL.RB Announces Intent to Issue Complaint Against La Conexion Familiar, a
Subsidiary of Sprint, Over Closure of its San Francisco Facility, Office of the General Counsel,
National Labor Relations Board, News Release, N.L.R.B. 94-2009 (Sept. 9, 1994), available in
1994 WL 499181.
87. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
88. See NLRB to Seek Injunctive Relief to Compel La Conexion Familiar, a Subsidiary of
Sprint Corp., to Reopen Its San Francisco Facility, Office of the General Counsel, National Labor
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Section 10(j) of the NLRA empowers the NLRB to seek injunctive
relief in United States District Court to "'alleviate the threat that delay
in the Board's processing of the unfair labor practice claims would'
undermine the goals of the NLRA." 9 At issue in Miller v. LCF, Inc.
was the right to organize into labor unions for the purpose of collective
bargaining provided for in Section 7 of the NLRA, and related anti-
discrimination provision in Section 8(a)(3) which expressly promises
protection from "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discour-
age membership in any labor organization." 90
The right of employees to organize to form unions was an express
goal of the NLRA. Protection from employer discrimination for exercis-
ing that right was also one of the NLRA's goals. The Wagner Act was
enacted during the Depression, when problems of economic stagnation
and unemployment were rampant. Supporters viewed its provisions as a
solution to the economic problems that beset the country: "[Senator
Wagner's] concern, and the concern of those who shared his views, was
not simply with organizational rights, but with the employees' effective
use of those rights to increase their wages, and thereby to increase their
purchasing power." 9' The NLRA was intended to wield economic mus-
cle both to provide relief from industrial strife and to bolster the con-
sumer market by providing a living wage.92 Thus, a retaliatory plant
closing would ostensibly offend the very core of the underlying premise
of the NLRA.
Case law, however, has mitigated the anti-discriminatory provision
of Section 8(a)(3) despite its express mandate. In Textile Workers v.
Darlington Manufacturing Co.,93 the Supreme Court held that an
employer can, under the auspices of the NLRA, lawfully close an entire
business even for anti-union motives. This holding reflects a judicial
reticence to interfere with the perogatives of capital. Section 8(a)(3) is
violated only when an employer closes part of a business for anti-union
reasons. Only then, the Supreme Court asserts, can the employer expect
to reap the benefit of his discrimination because discriminatory partial
Relations Board, News Release, NL.R,B. 94-2014 (Sept. 16, 1994), available in 1994 WL
512067.
89. Miller v. LCF, Inc., No. C-94-3372-VRM, 1994 WL 669837, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
1994) (quoting Miller v. California Pacific Medical Center, 19 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir, 1994) (en
banc)).
90. 29 U.S.C. I 158(a)(3) (1994).
91. Joan Baker, NLRA Section 8(a)(3) and the Search for a National Labor Policy, 7
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 71, 77 (1989).
92. See Terry Colllngsworth, Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act-Plant Closings
and Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J, EMp. & LAB, L. 72, 77 (1993).
93. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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closing may chill exercise of the remaining employees statutory rights
under Section 7.94
Clearly, the LCF workers' attempt to form a union is a protected
activity under the NLRA. Moreover, injunctive relief ordering the plant
re-opened would be an appropriate interim remedy where the actual
closing of the plant is a Section 8(a)(3) violation.95 Thus, injunctive
relief requires that a plant's closure be motivated by the purpose of "dis-
courag[ing] membership in [a] labor organization. '96 The fact that LCF
was a subsidiary of Sprint means that the "discouragement" need not be
limited to the employees of LCF, but can include other employees of
Sprint, the ultimate employer.
Evaluating motive in such cases requires sifting through competing
arguments. The Board argued that Sprint closed LCF to avoid unioniza-
tion of its workforce. Sprint countered with evidence that the business
was closed for financial reasons. "Mixed motive" cases are evaluated
under the standard which emerged from the Wright Line case.97 If the
union makes a prima facie case that the protected conduct was a moti-
vating factor in the employer's alleged unlawful action, the Wright Line
burden requires an employer to demonstrate that the same action would
have taken place in the absence of the protected activity.
In Miller v. LCF, Inc., the Board presented sufficient evidence to
make out a prima facie case that anti-union sentiment was a motivating
factor in the plant closure.9" Therefore, Sprint had the burden of demon-
strating that the closure, at the time it was announced, was a foregone
conclusion. Because Sprint presented compelling evidence to that end, 99
the court concluded that the employer had a good chance of meeting its
Wright Line burden. The judge held injunctive relief inappropriate:
although the Board did have a fair chance of prevailing on the merits,
Sprint could demonstrate the closure would have taken place even in the
absence of union activity, as required by the Wright Line standard.100
Thus, the balance of hardships did not favor the Board.
94. See id. at 275; PHILIP A. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DIscRETION:
PLANT CLOSINGS, RELOCATION, SUBCONTRACTING AND AUTOMATION 172-73 (1983).
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1994).
96. Id. § 158(a)(3).
97. See Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The Wright Line test, formulated
by the Board, was expressly approved as the proper standard for these types of evaluations by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transp. Management, Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 (1983).
98. See Miller v. LCF, Inc., No. C-94-3372-VRM, 1994 WL 669837, at *4-*6 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 18, 1994).
99. See id. at *6-*8. Sprint presented a projected loss of nearly four million dollars if it
continued operating LCF throughout 1994. See id. at *6.
100. See id. at *9.
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The court reasoning on the balance of hardship analysis is interest-
ing. The court noted that "[it] must 'take into account the probability
that declining to issue the injunction will permit the allegedly unfair
labor practice to reach fruition and thereby render meaningless the
board's remedial authority' when balancing hardships."1 1 The court
balanced the hardship the discharged employees would endure should
the Board prevail against the hardship that re-opening the facility would
impose upon Sprint.1"2 All of the company's equipment had been dis-
mantled and its customer base had eroded.10 3 If Sprint prevailed before
the administrative law judge, it "would not be reimbursed for operating
losses incurred as a result of the injunction."' 04 This burden was
weighed against the hardship on the employees who had lost their jobs
in the event the Board prevailed.'0 5 The "chill" factor was only consid-
ered with respect to former LCF employees who might be wary of exer-
cising their statutory rights in the future. Notably missing from the
opinion is any reference to the other Sprint employees whose Section 7
rights might be chilled if the plant closing was adjudicated an 8(a)(3)
violation.
The Miller court reasoned that "[a] make-whole order awarding
back pay and other damages to LCF's former employees in this case
would sufficiently fulfill the policies of the NLRA." 10 6 Moreover, the
court continued, "[r]eopening LCF now will not cure any damage done
to the union or the bargaining unit. The substantial hardship to Sprint of
inflicting substantial losses for which there is no possible redress signifi-
cantly outweighs any public interest in reopening the facility."'' 0 7 The
holding, however, in Darlington-that partial closings motivated by
union animus are unfair labor practices-was predicated on the fact that
"a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) if motivated
by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the
single employer and if the employer may reasonably have foreseen that
such closing would likely have that effect."'0 8 Back pay and other dam-
ages arguably will not remedy the chill the plant closing may have on
other employees of Sprint when they consider exercising their right to
unionize. The fact that Sprint was the major focus of a CWA organiza-
tion drive since 1992 arguably compels consideration in the hardship







107. Id. at *9.
108. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 275.
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analysis of the "chill" effect on other Sprint employees. °9
Intuitively, the idea of ordering an employer to re-open a plant
seems anti-American, despite the express statutory language of the
NLRA. Perhaps this is because our sense of appreciation for employers'
property prerogatives is so strong and ingrained. This denial of relief in
Miller catapulted the facts of that case into another forum in the form of
a complaint against the U.S.
IV. THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES UNDER NAALC
The U.S. district court's denial of a temporary restraining order in
Miller v. LCF, Inc. formed the alleged violation of NAALC in a com-
plaint filed, by the Telephone Workers of the Republic of Mexico on
November 18, 1994. The complaint further alleged that the prolonged
NLRB appeals process itself constitutes non-compliance with the princi-
ples espoused in Annex One of NAALC. t 0 The Mexican union brought
the complaint pursuant to the provisions guaranteed in Annex One of
NAALC, specifically "freedom of association and protection of the right
organize.""' 1
To better understand the politics behind the complaint, two alli-
ances are important to note. The first is a proposed joint venture
between Sprint and Telefonos de Mexico, a company which currently
enjoys a telephone service monopoly in Mexico. On December 14,
1994, Sprint Corporation announced an alliance with Telefonos de Mex-
109. See generally International Union Pressuring Sprint, supra note 2, at A16.
110. See Complaint Filed by the Union of Telephone Workers of the Republic of Mexico With
the National Administrative Office of the United States of Mexico, reprinted in Complaint
Against Sprint Filed by Mexican Telephone Workers Union, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at
D27 (Feb. 10, 1995). Part of the complaint reads as follows:
According to the law in the United States of America known as the National Labor
Relations Act, workers have the right to freely form unions.... From the beginning
of February and through July the management of Sprint/La Conexion Familiar in
San Francisco engaged in an anti-union campaign, engaging in at least 48 violations
of the National Labor Relations Act, violations which have been documented in the
records of the National Labor Relations Board .... This irregular action by Sprint
caused the workers to turn to the appropriate judicial authorities to demand, among
other things, their reinstatement. This request for immediate reinstatement through
a federal injunction was denied, which constitutes [a] serious violation of the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation by U.S authorities.
In addition a trial was held, in which it was demonstrated that more than 50
violations of the law were committed. This trial will probably be decided between
March and June. An appeal by the losing party could prolong the proceeding
another two to three years according to experts. This slow process demonstrates the
ineffectiveness of U.S. law in complying with the principles contained in Annex
One of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation to which it is now
obligated.
111. See id. NAALC, supra note 27, annex one at 1515.
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ico to provide long-distance service between Mexico and the United
States; the announcement precipitated a rise in Sprint's stock price by
$1.37 per share." 2 The alliance will additionally provide data and video
service between Mexico and the United States." 3 The long-distance
monopoly enjoyed by Telefonos de Mexico expires in 1997,114 at which
time foreign companies will be allowed to compete in the Mexican mar-
ket. Other companies, such as GTE and MCI, have also formed joint
ventures with Mexican companies to effectively compete in Mexico's
profitable long-distance market."t5 It is important to note these pro-
posed joint ventures because immense profits hinge upon capturing and
maintaining a large percentage of the Mexican market.
Another important alliance to the NAALC complaint process was
the alliance entered into by the Communication Workers of America on
February 12, 1992, with the Telephone Workers Union of the Republic
of Mexico." 6 The Telephone Workers Union of Mexico initiated the
complaint in order to promote the mutual interests of the telecommuni-
cations workers that they and the CWA represented.' 1 7 Because of the
structure of NAALC-where complaints constitute allegations that
another signatory country is not enforcing its own labor laws-labor
alliances likely will become increasingly utilized as a strategy to extract
relief.
The following information was presented in the Complaint:
Sprint/ La Conexion Familiar fired a total of 235 employees and
workers and intends to remove all traces [desaparacer] of this enter-
prise in San Francisco, California.
112. See News: Business, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 1994, at 3.
113. See World Watch: International Business, L.A. TimEs, Apr. 20, 1995, at 4.
114. See Damian Fraser, International Company News: GTE Agrees Mexican Telephone
Venture, FiN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at 34.
115. At the time this Comment was written Mexico's international long-distance market was
valued 1.5 billion dollars. See Sprint, Grupo lusacell Plan Joint Venture in Mexico, WALL ST. J.,
July 26, 1994, at A13.
116. See Dora Delgado, International Labor: Mexican NAO Report Says U.S. Labor Laws
May Have Been Violated in Sprint Firings, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at D3 (June 5, 1995).
117. See Complaint Filed by the Union of Telephone Workers of the Republic of Mexico With
the National Administrative Office of the United States of Mexico, supra note 110; see also
Robert Collier, Sprint Accused Under NAFTA at S.F. Hearing/U.S., Mexico Unions Protest
Cutting Jobs of 235 Latinos, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28, 1996, at A3. This newspaper article credits
Morton Bahr, president of the Communications Workers of America, with asking the Mexican
union to file the complaint under the NAALC. Francisco Hernandez, President of the
complaining Mexican union, makes it clear that his complaint issued in part because the case was
"an example of the most flagrant violations of workers' rights." Hernandez, however, also admits
that his union filed the complaint partly out of self-interest, in that Sprint, in its joint venture with
Telefonos de Mexico, was trying to break the union's traditional closed shop representation of
company workers. See id.
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Throughout the United States Sprint has 16,000 long distance
workers.
The workers of La Conexion Familiar are the only Sprint long
distance workers who have pursued their right to a union election to
the final step.
Sprint has a corporate policy of preventing the unionization of
its workers.
The attempt by the workers of La Conexion Familiar to join a
union raised expectations among other workers at Sprint.
These facts, together with the slow process of seeking remedies
to violations of labor law in the United States, explain the vicious
anti-union policy at Sprint which caused it to fire all its workers and
close the facility alleging financial problems.
Because of these events, it is not illogical to believe that a mul-
tinational corporation which forms an alliance with another will try to
impose conditions which threaten workers and which are violations
of the rights contained in the labor laws of each country. We do not
want this to happen with Sprint in Mexico." 8
The complaint asked that the Mexican NAO investigate the charge
pursuant to the power accorded it under Article 16 of the NAALC agree-
ment.119 It further requested that the Mexican NAO: hold a hearing in
San Francisco to obtain testimony from the fired workers and to recom-
mend an effective judicial remedy; declare Sprint in violation of the
labor norms in the NAALC; that, pursuant to the Mexican Constitution,
Sprint be foreclosed from operating in this manner and be foreclosed
from operating at all in Mexico because of its abysmal labor record; that
Sprint reinstate the fired workers; that Sprint declare it will respect the
rights of workers as set out in the principles in NAALC if it should
operate in Mexico; that the signatory nations convene a forum of gov-
ernment, management and labor representatives from the telecommuni-
cations industry in order to better promote the workers' rights and
conditions; and that the Mexican NAO develop standards that will help
promote Mexican workers' rights when employed in the United
States. 120
The complaint demonstrates familiarity with U.S. labor doctrine in
that it comports with the elements necessary to allege a partial, illegal
closing under Darlington.121 The non-enforcement of the signatory's
domestic law-the standard for a NAALC violation-is the denial of
118. See Complaint Filed by the Union of Telephone Workers of the Republic of Mexico with
the National Administrative Office of the United States of Mexico, supra note 110.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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injunctive relief in Miller v. LCF, Inc. which the complaint alleges ren-
ders the Section 7 rights expressly granted by the NLRA, nugatory. The
injury, the "chill" to remaining workers of Sprint, absent in the hardship
balancing done by the district court, is expressly declared in the
complaint.'
22
The veiled reference to Sprint's attempt to gain access to the Mexi-
can market must be viewed as an exercise of realpolitik by the union.
Now, Sprint's interest in capturing a substantial share of the Mexican
market may be susceptible to heightened scrutiny and negative publicity.
V. THE MEXICAN NAO REPORT
The Mexican NAO accepted the submission and investigated the
charge.' 2 3 Released June 2, 1992, the Mexican NAO report concluded
that U.S. workers' rights to organize were probably violated by the clos-
ing of the LCF facility by Sprint. The report noted:
After studying matters related to U.S. labor legislation related to
Public Submission 9501/NAOMEX [the complaint], particularly
under the rubric of freedom of association and the right of workers to
organize, the NAO of Mexico is concerned about the effectiveness of
certain measures intended to guarantee these fundamental labor
principles.
During the analysis it became clear that legislators, and U.S.
federal authorities responsible for the application of legislation, give
great importance to these principles, and rights.' 24
122. In fact, the "chill" in this case may be very substantial. A stipulation agreed to by Sprint
and the CWA in the subsequent trial before an AU on the unfair labor charges indicates that
union organization had been taking place at Sprint long distance facilities for some time:
The Communications Workers of America has attempted to organize Sprint workers
assigned to long distance operations as a major focus for its national organizing
efforts since at least 1990. Since at least 1990, CWA has had various levels of
public organizing activity, led by unit employees, at various Sprint long distance
locations, including [a list of at least 16 locations]. CWA buttons and T-shirts have
been worn from time to time by Sprint employees at the foregoing locations. Also,
employees and CWA organizers have, from time to time, publicly handed out
organizational materials at all of such locations. There has, as yet, been no petition
for a representation election filed on behalf of employees at any Sprint long distance
locations.
LCF, Inc., N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 at 25 n.20 (Aug. 30, 1995).
123. See Dora Delgado, NAFTA: Mexican Official Says Investigation of Sprint Not in
Retaliation for Sony Case, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 87, at D19 (May 5, 1995). There was
some speculation that the Mexican NAO had accepted the Sprint case in retaliation for the
complaint issued by the U.S. NAO against Mexico in the Sony case. The Mexican NAO,
however, vehemently denied charge. See id.
124. See Report on Review of Public Submission 9501, National Administrative Office of
Mexico for the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, at 11 (U.S. NAO staff trans.,
May 31, 1995) [hereinafter Mex. NAO Report].
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The report specifically referred to the Mexican government require-
ment of evaluation of the effects on workers when an employer suddenly
decides to shut down. 125 In other words, Mexican law limits the
employer's prerogative to unequivocally make decisions about its capital
resources. The report requested ministerial consultations pursuant to
Article 22 of NAALC because it could not conclude that the United
States enforced its own labor laws.
126
The Mexican NAO report points out another weakness of American
labor law. First National Maintenance v. NLRB Corporation held that
an employer had no duty to bargain with its certified union over its deci-
sion to close a segment of the business and terminate the employees that
worked there. 127 The union had alleged 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) violations,
asserting that plant closure was a "term and condition" of employment
and was therefore within the province of the employer's duty to "bargain
in good faith."' 28 Section 8(a) states "[i]t shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
[9(a)] . ,,1"9 Section 9(a) defines the parameters of collective bargain-
ing as "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment."' 30 Although both lower courts held for the union, the
Supreme Court overruled them. The Supreme Court's decision hinged
on the premise that the entrepreneurial character of the decision at issue
precluded it from being a term or condition of employment.
The Court announced the standard under which bargaining over a
plant closing should be evaluated: "... . [I]n view of an employer's need
for unencumbered decision making, bargaining over management deci-
sions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-manage-
ment relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the bur-
den placed on the conduct of the business."' 3I The Court's application
of the test trumped the "incremental benefit that might be gained
through the union's participation in making the decision" with the
employer's need to make purely economic decisions.'
32
The Court's conclusion was far from foregone. Section 8(d) of the
NLRA expressly mitigates the burden that bargaining in good faith
125. See Delgado, supra note 116, at D3.
126. Mex. NAO Report, supra note 124, at 12.
127. 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
128. See id. at 670.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994).
130. Id. § 159(a) (emphasis added).
131. 452 U.S. at 679.
132. Id. at 686.
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would impose on the employer in the face of a plant closing. It notes,
"to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees ... [it] does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."1 33 As one commentator noted:
The flaws in [the] ... decision... are too many to enumerate in full
.... These flaws can be summed up-in much the same manner as
in the Darlington case-as an unexamined exaltation of the
employer's interest in unfettered control over major managerial deci-
sions, without sufficient concern for a most basic statutory policy,
here the participation of workers in discussing decisions (without the
power to dictate the substantive terms) directly affecting their job
security, literally their "terms and conditions of employment.' 34
Thus, the inclusion in the Mexican NAO report of concerns about how
American labor law treats plant closings, in contrast with its own legal
requirements that the effect upon workers be considered in such deci-
sions, highlights another way that American law fails to effectuate the
principles committed to in NAALC.
The Mexican NAO report was received positively by the CWA,
which expressed delight with the result. The report preceded the trial on
the merits of the unfair labor charges before an administrative labor
judge from the NLRB. The Daily Labor Report for June 6, 1995
reported:
[CWA union spokesman Jeff Miller] said [though] he was not
certain whether the NAO process would result in a remedy for the
workers who lost their jobs . . . he was hopeful that the attention
generated by the Mexican NAO report could prevent other companies
from abusing labor laws. CWA is pinning its hopes for redress in the
Sprint case on a ruling expected next month from a U.S. administra-
tive law judge. The union anticipates that the ALJ will determine
that Sprint violated the NLRA and shut down the subsidiary because
of the union election.
135
On June 26, 1995, Robert Reich accepted the request for ministerial con-
sultations.136 Moreover, at a convention of the Communication Workers
133. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
134. Robert A. Gorman, The Negligible Impact of the National Labor Relations Act on
Managerial Decisions to Close or Relocate, 58 TuL. L. REv. 1354, 1361-62 (1984).
135. Pamela M. Prah, NAFTA: U.S. Reviews Mexican NAO Charges on Sprint; CWA
'Pleasantly Surprised,' Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 108, at D18 (June 6, 1995).
136. See Secretary of Labor Accepts Ministerial Consultations, Bureau of International Affairs,
Office of Info., U.S. D.O.L., News Release, U.S.D.L. 95-240 (June 26, 1995), available in 1995
WL 377682. The text of the letter reads:
Dear Secretary Oate:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter in which you requested that we
consult on the matter of the Public Communication 9501/NAOMEX, in accordance
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of America, Reich announced that he would meet face-to-face with top
Mexican labor officials regarding the Sprint matter.
13 7
Again, it is important to note the concurrent alternative track that
NAALC affords creative labor organizations. At this stage, the trial on
the merits had not yet been resolved. Only application for injunctive
relief pursuant to 100) of the NLRA had been adjudicated. Hearings
before an administrative law judge had been held, but the decision on
the merits of the 8 (a)(3) charge of the discriminatory closing of the
plant, among other charges of unfair labor practices, had not yet been
resolved. Not only did NAALC provide an alternative forum for the
complaint, but one that at least potentially could influence the disposi-
tion of the trial on the merits.
VI. LCF, INC. V. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA 138
As it turned out, however, relief to the terminated workers was not
forthcoming from the administrative law judge ("ALJ"). In a decision
rendered on September 1, 1995, the ALJ in LCF, Inc. v Communications
Workers of America held that the plant closed due to nondiscriminatory
reasons.1 39 Although the ALJ found evidence of numerous 8(a)(1) vio-
lations, he held that the plant closing itself was not a violation of
8(a)(3). 4 ° Moreover, he adjudged that the numerous threats made to
employees of a retaliatory plant closing, illegal under NLRA jurispru-
dence, 141 were made by supervisors in their individual capacity, and did
not reflect a Sprint policy of discrimination in their decision to close. 142
Despite evidence that the plant hired telemarketers up to the day before
closing, recently installed new equipment in its expansion to another
floor, and hired a new president the month before closing, the judge
with Article 22 of the [NAALC]. I have read the report prepared by the Mexican
NAO and accept your request for ministerial consultations in this case. Please be
assured that the United States will continue to cooperate in fulfilling our joint
obligations under the NAALC.
I share your view that Mexico and the Untied States have made significant
progress in the implementation of the NAALC. I, too, believe that these joint efforts
should be directed toward improving the standard of living of the workers of our





137. See Daniel J. Roy, NAFTA: Reich Agrees to Face-to-Face Meeting with Mexican
Officials Regarding Sprint, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at D17 (July 11, 1995).
138. N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 (Aug. 30, 1995).
139. See id. at 33.
140. See id.
141. See NLRB v Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
142. See N.L.R.B. Case 20-CA-26203 at 33.
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found Sprint's evidence that the closing was due to LCF's poor fiscal
performance more compelling. To his credit, there was a plethora of
evidence presented by Sprint detailing LCF's poor financial perform-
ance. Though the AJ maintains otherwise, his holding on the 8(a)(3)
charge appeared to be predicated on the fact that he found two employ-
ees, who testified that the president told them that anti-union animus
contributed to the closing, to be uncredible witnesses. 143 Moreover, he
maintained that even had he had found them believable, he would have
reached the same result because the "financial rationale for the closure
advanced by the Respondent was of such overriding significance that
even if the union-related matters were included within a list of contribut-
ing factors the Respondent would have sustained its burden of demon-
strating that LCF would have been closed regardless of such
considerations." 14
The remedy for the numerous unfair labor practices that Sprint
committed was somewhat meaningless. The judge ordered:
The Respondent LCF, INC. d/b/a La Conexion Familiar and Sprint
Corporation, their officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees verbally or in writing with the closure
of LCF because of the Union.
(b) Interrogating employees regarding their union activities.
(c) Requesting that employees distribute anti-union buttons.
(d) Soliciting grievances from employees.
(e) Creating the impression of surveillance of employees' union
activities.
(f) Implementing changes in employees' working conditions.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them under
section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Mail to the last known address of each of its former LCF
employees a copy of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."1
4 5
The notice in the Appendix contains statements by Sprint that they will
cease from engaging in any of the violative actions listed in the Cease
and Desist Order and affirms the rights of workers to engage in unioni-
zation efforts.
143. See id. at 32.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 34-35.
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The irony is clear. LCF is no longer operating. The fact that Sprint
ceased from engaging in the violative acts is meaningless from the point
of view of the injured employees. Refraining from threatening a retalia-
tory closing to employees who already lost their jobs is specious at best.
The only way that the remedy could prospectively effectuate the statu-
tory rights granted by the NLRA would be if the notice were distributed
to other Sprint employees who might benefit from receipt of the Cease
and Desist Order. Because the closing was held not to be a partial clos-
ing, however, such a remedy was not appropriate.
The CWA and the General Counsel of the NLRB filed briefs to
appeal the ALJ's decision. Thus, the decision is proceeding under the
provisions for appellate review of NLRB decisions in the U.S. judicial
system.
The AL'S decision no doubt influenced the outcome of the allega-
tions that the U.S. was not fulfilling its obligations under NAALC. Had
the NLRB decided in favor of the union, the charge that the U.S. was not
enforcing NLRA provisions would have less substance. Because the
ALJ decided in favor of Sprint, the charge that NLRA provisions were
not being enforced by the judiciary in the U.S. had arguable merit.
Therefore, the alternative forum and quasi-judicial tract created by
NAALC remained unobstructed,146 and the ministerial consultations
continued unabated.
VII. TlE RESULT OF MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS
On December 18, 1996, U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich and
Mexican Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare Javier Bonilla signed a
pact. 47 This pact is historic in several senses. First, it is the result of
the first charge against the U.S. under NAALC for non-enforcement of
its own labor laws. Moreover, it is the first time the "special study
clause" in the NAALC agreement has been triggered." 8 The pact com-
mits the Labor Secretariat to study the effect of sudden plant closings in
all three signatory nations with a view of promoting the principle of free
association embodied in NAALC.'49 Such a study has never been done
before. The pact called for the U.S. Labor Department to hold a public
146. Perhaps the ministerial consultations would have continued even if the outcome of LCF v.
CWA was inapposite. One can only surmise, however, that if the result had been different, U.S.
officials would have pointed to a favorable decision as a vindication of the rights granted by the
NLRA and the judicial procedures available in the U.S. for their effectuation.
147. See Daniel J. Roy, NAFTA: U.S., Mexico Reach Accord on Sprint NAFTA Charge;
Closings Set for Study, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No 242, at D14 (Dec. 18, 1995).
148. See Telephone Interview with Lance A. Compa, supra note 57.
149. See Roy, supra note 147, at D14.
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forum devoted to this inquiry within 120 days in San Francisco. °50 The
pact also committed Reich to keeping his Mexican counterpart abreast of
the status of the appeal of LCF, Inc. v Communications Workers of
America.151
The public hearing was held on February 27, 1996.152 Former LCF
employees were present to testify and the heads of the Mexican and
German telephone unions were in attendance.1 53 Former employees tes-
tified that working conditions were deplorable-they had to raise their
hands to go to the bathroom, were told to monitor their intake of liquids
and worked for promised commissions that did not materialize.' 54  No
Sprint officials spoke at the forum.1 55 Moderators at the hearing-offi-
cials from the U.S, Canada and Mexico-only possessed the power to
issue a report to the NAFTA overseers.
156
Although the hearings have no explicit power to effect change in
U.S. labor law, they offer a new avenue for heightened public awareness
of unionization problems. "'[A] new legal channel has opened up for
unions,' Daniel Mitchell, an economist at the University of California
Los Angeles, 'I don't think anybody foresaw that NAFTA procedures
would get used this way.' 1 5 7 Another comment noted, "' [t]his case has
given [the unions] an opportunity ... to indicate publicly the level of
problems the NLRB doesn't seem to be capable of solving.""
151
150. See id. The public forum was not supposed to specifically focus on Sprint. See
Telephone Interview with Lance A. Compa, supra note 57. Such emphasis, however, considering
the factual events that precipitated the forum, was difficult to avoid.
151. See Agreements on Implementation-Ministerial Consultations Submission 9501 (Sprint
Case), reprinted in Agreement Reached Between Mexico and U.S on Labor Issue, Bureau of
International Affairs, Office of Info., U.S. D.O.L., News Release, U.S.D.L. 95-521 (Dec. 17,
1995), available in 1995 WL 788333.
152. The Hearing was held between 9:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. at the ANA hotel, 50 Third Street, San
Francisco. See Marsha Ginsberg, Unusual S.F. Hearing for Sprint Workers Complain Phone
Giant is Evading Labor Laws, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 27, 1996, at D1.
153. The presence of the German telephone workers union is significant because in 1994,
Sprint arranged a deal that allowed for twenty percent of its own stock to be purchased by France
Telecom and Deutsche Bundespost Telekom. See Kevin Kelly, Sprint Picks Up the Pace, Bus.
WK., Sept. 5, 1994, at 84. The French and German companies in 1994 shared fourteen percent of
the long distance traffic of the largest multinationals. See id. The German union wants to thwart
threats that Sprint's presence in Germany may threaten job security, wages and working
conditions there. See Telephone Interview with Lance A. Compa, Labor Law Director of the
NAFTA Labor Secretariat (Aug. 16, 1996).
154. See Collier, supra note 117, at A3.
155. See id.
156. See Mexico Uses NAFTA to Challenge Sprint Closure in U.S., ARiz. DA.Y STAR, Feb.
28, 1996, at 9A.
157. Karen Branden, No Closure in Labor Fight Over Sprint Plant Closing, Cm. TRm., Feb.
25, 1996, at ..
158. Lorraine Woellert, Mexican Complaint Leads to Major Test for NAFTA U.S. Probes
Sprint for Closing Plant, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at Al. (quoting Pharis Harvey, executive
director of the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund).
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Pragmatically, a CWA spokesman noted, "'[w]e have NAFTA, it's
there, so we'll use it in an attempt to make the process work.' "159 The
tri-national study of the effect of plant closings upon the principle of
freedom of association in Annex One of NAALC is due in December,
1996.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, a public forum and a study cannot, in and of themselves,
change any established policy regarding plant closings. They carry no
measure of relief for the specific workers who lost their jobs at LCF, as
there would have been (and may be if the result of the case is overruled
on appeal) if the holding in LCF v. CWA had been different. This mea-
sure is not on par with reinstatement of the unemployed workers in other
areas of Sprint's enterprise. Nor is it tantamount to the financial remu-
neration of lost wages. It is arguably, however, no small victory for the
alliance of CWA and the Telephone Workers of the Republic of Mexico.
A different outcome in LCF v. CWA would have provided a remedy for
the specifically injured workers of the closed facility, but it would not
have probed into the philosophic assumptions underlying the fairly set-
tled U.S. case law with regard to plant closings.'
60
The doctrine of partial closings in American labor law has narrowly
construed the statutory rights granted by the NLRA. An employer can
discriminate against workers because of their union activity so long as
he expects to reap no future benefits from his discrimination, i.e.,
employees may close their entire enterprise. 61 Such a holding is at vari-
ance with the express language of Section 7. Moreover, the Wright Line
doctrine further eviscerates the protection available under Section 7 of
the NLRA, because as long as the employer can present legal reasons for
closing-such as poor finances-multiple other unfair labor practices
may accompany the closing. This doctrine ignores the actual result that
multiple Wright Line closings may have on the workers' exercise of the
right to organize. Moreover, parent companies may close subsidiaries
because of anti-union discrimination with impunity under the Wright
Line standard.
Both doctrines are predicated on the philosophic assumption that
certain managerial decisions are so crucial that they must be free of gov-
ernment regulation, despite the clear mandate of the NLRA.' 162 The
holding of First National Maintenance v. NLRB further demonstrates
159. Id. (quoting Jeff Miller).
160. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
161. See id. at 273-74.
162. See ATLESON, supra note 26, at 139.
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this philosophic assumption. This case held that an employer had no
duty to bargain with its certified union over its decision to close a seg-
ment of the business and terminate the employees who worked there,
despite the fact that the express language of the relevant provisions of
the NLRA does not mandate such a result. Therefore, a study of the
actual effects that such plant closings have upon freedom of association
may make explicit the injury to statutory rights caused by the assump-
tions underlying judicial interpretation of the NLRA. Although the
unprecedented study will not change the law in and of itself, it can edu-
cate the public. This comports with a new "blueprint" for revitalizing
the labor movement in the U.S. by the AFL-CIO. Four areas have been
targeted for increased emphasis: political action, strategic campaigns,
public affairs and education and training.1
6 1
Additionally, the study may compliment specific judicial relief to
the former employees of LCF in U.S. courts if the appeal of LCF v.
CWA is successful. Such is the nature of the dual track that NAALC
facilitates.
LCF v. CWA and the cases which have been brought against Mex-
ico for non-enforcement of its own labor laws should become prototypes
for a new type of quasi-judicial challenge. Thus far, unions have chal-
lenged only three of the principles espoused by NAALC. The unions,
however, appear increasingly willing to utilize the relief that NAALC
may offer them. NAALC not only encourages governmental coopera-
tion with regard to labor matters, but it also facilitates, via the particular
structure of the complaint process, cross-border union alliances. More-
over, the opening of the Mexican markets to foreign participants creates
a unique and additional incentive for labor unions to form cross-border
alliances to promote better labor conditions." Together, they may try
to turn public concern over profit margins, into public concern over bet-
ter enforcement of the labor laws of the signatory countries. Bad public-
ity may injure targeted companies in terms of their competitive stance
vis-a-vis entrance into the market. Therefore, the unions may have a
chance to exert economic pressure toward greater compliance with the
domestic laws of the signatory countries.
Even apart from entrance into the market, the Labor Secretariat
hopes it will be able to achieve greater compliance with the laws of the
signatory countries through the education provided by "special studies."
Perhaps these studies, like the occasional law review article, can influ-
ence the outcome of a close case. They may be able to exert influence
163. See Michelle Amber, Organizing: More Union Organizing Activity Predicted:
Effectiveness is Questioned by Observers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at D22 (Feb. 6, 1996).
164. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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via their recommendations in pending legislation. At the very least, they
can educate the public about the glaring weaknesses of a law which is, in
its application, often at variance with its statutory purpose.
165
Currently, cases are being prepared to test the other principles of
NAALC. 166 This is a good sign that labor is coming to terms with the
fact that, while the tract afforded by NAALC may be weak in the sanc-
tions it can impose directly, it may offer the only forum for re-opening
questions that have been long settled in U.S. case law. And, rather than
dismissing NAALC as an ineffective agreement, labor should explore
the opportunity it does afford. Only through carefully planned chal-
lenges under each of the eleven principles that NAALC espouses can its
true effectiveness be known.
SARAH LOWE
165. For example, one can imagine a Mexican labor union challenging the American labor
doctrine of permanent replacement of economic strikers, introduced by the Supreme Court in dicta
in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). This is certainly inimical to the
prinsiples espoused in Annex One of NAALC. Moreover, the fact that Mexican law does not
permit replacement of legally striking workers provides a credible predicate for such a challenge.
166. See Telephone Interview with Lance A. Compa, supra note 57.
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